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new media. ' 5 With advances in online publishing has come the need to evaluate the quality of ever-increasing numbers of papers and publications along with the advent of fraudulent journals. These issues are the academic equivalent of fake news. For open access publishing to reach its full potential (i.e., provide maximum net benefits), the cost of fraud and misinformation must be minimized. Both the benefits and the costs of an open access model have been explored thoroughly in the literature.
As to the benefits, the Public Library of Science (PLOS) lists the main benefits of open access publishing as falling into three major categories: 6 promoting discovery (open access expands the dissemination of research results that become the impetus for new scholarship), documenting social benefits (open access allows taxpayers and others to see the results of publicly funded scientific and medical research), and improving education (open access gives teachers and students access to the latest research findings). More directly, open access publishing can improve education through the creation of open educational resources. In addition, reducing production costs, lowering barriers to entry, and promoting competition are potential benefits of open access publishing. The high cost of access to research results through the traditional scholarly publishing model has prompted support for open access and led to a targeted protest against a publisher using the traditional model.
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But aside from its many benefits, the expansion of open access publishing creates substantial (external) costs. The traditional model of scholarly publishing provides incentives for quality through the scholarly associations who run journals and own copyrights. Scholarly journals act as a form of branding that provides reliable information and some level of assured quality. The advent of the open access publishing model created new possibilities for entrepreneurial for-profit publishers and introduced the potential for imperfect information and fraud.
8 A for-profit open access business model incentivizes the acceptance of articles without regard to quality or accuracy. This incentive is compounded by the incentive to publish prolifically that motivates researchers and their institutions.
The consequences of open access publishing for academia have yet to be adequately addressed according to Frosio: 'So far, academia seems to have embraced [open access publishing] as a panacea for all the evils of commercial academic publishing, but a serious consideration regarding the way in which [open access publishing] is going to change academic mechanics, especially in the domain of academic careers, promotion and reputation, still seems to be necessary and so far not fully achieved.' It can be useful to characterize the debate over open access publishing in terms of the basic market structure models used by economists. The traditional approach to scholarly publishing can be viewed in the context of an imperfectly competitive model while the transition to open access publishing can be seen as a movement toward the model of perfect competition. It is well known that competitive markets are associated with improvements in efficiency, but only in the absence of market failures.
Currently, versions of both traditional and open access models exist in the scholarly publishing market, sometimes in the same company. Elsevier 10 is an example of a publisher now operating with both traditional and open access models. On Elsevier's website, the two business models, traditional and open access, are described as follows:
1. subscription articles whose publication is funded by payments that are made by subscribing individuals or institutions; and 2. open access articles whose publication is funded by payments that are made by authors, their institution, or funding bodies, also known as article publishing charges.
Elsevier prices its open access option varyingly for its publications, with article publishing charges ranging from $500 to $5000 USD, based on a journal's quality, its editorial and production costs, competitive considerations, market conditions, and other revenue streams associated with the journal. Elsevier claims that its dual tracks to publication lead to the same quality of output: 'Irrespective of the publishing model chosen by the author, our goal is to ensure articles are published as quickly as possible, subject to appropriate quality controls, and widely disseminated.' 11 defining the market for scholarly publishing Before discussing alternative market models, we must first define the market for scholarly publishing (e.g., the product, producers, and consumers in the market). For example, the scholarly publishing product could be viewed as the journal, the article, or the research results. How the product is defined changes depending on which groups are seen as the consumers and producers. For example, if the product is the journal, then the publisher is the producer and subscribers (e.g., libraries) are consumers. Or, if a scholarly article is the product, then publishers are consumers and authors are producers. Another possibility is to view a citation on a researcher's CV as the product, which makes authors consumers and publishers producers. Finally, if research results are the relevant product, then research institutions are producers and those interested in the results (e.g., the public, other researchers) are consumers. The definition of the product is often at the root of differences within discussions of scholarly publishing.
Depending on the definition of the product, the supply side of the market could be made up of publishers, authors, or research institutions, and the demand side of the market could be made up of subscribers (libraries), publishers, authors, or the public. For this analysis, we define the product as a scholarly journal; therefore scholarly publishers are the producers. Research articles written by authors are an essential input to production, and journals are the output. Publishers add value to the research articles by providing 1) a review of research to verify and improve quality; 2) professional editing of the article; and 3) dissemination of the research results. Publishers incur production costs (e.g., administrative and editorial costs) and must have sufficient revenue to cover those costs in order to remain in the market.
With this market definition in place, the individuals and institutions that subscribe to scholarly journals are the consumers. However, open access publishing means that research articles are made available at no cost to anyone with access to the Internet. In a completely open access environment, there are no subscribers, so an alternative source of revenue is needed to cover production costs. The following analysis of the scholarly publishing market is based on this basic market definition.
traditional market for scholarly journal publishing The traditional market for scholarly publishing was the primary method of disseminating research results before the Internet. The traditional market we describe here is typified. (Disciplines may differ in their process for publishing. Here we look at a simplified model and speak in terms of a general, though not ubiquitous, publishing process.) Scholarly publishers, often academic associations and university presses, are the producers in the traditional market. Scholarly journals accept submissions for a low fee or no fee and provide peer review, article editing, and journal production to give permanent form to articles that circulate in scholarly journals. The costs of producing a scholarly journal are covered by the publisher's revenue from subscription fees and society memberships.
In the traditional market, academic and research institutions are buyers. But they actually play two important roles in the market: they provide input, and they purchase the product. Academic institutions provide the most important input into the production of an academic journal (i.e., scholarly articles submitted) by hiring researchers (e.g., faculty) and listing publication among their job requirements. Authors are 'paid' for their research through increases in their reputation, job security, advancement, and/or salary increases. These institutions often provide peer review by allowing or encouraging their researchers to participate in the review process. One critic of the traditional publishing model writes, 'The biggest travesty is that the scientific community carries out peer review -a major part of scholarly publishing -for free, yet subscription-journal publishers charge billions of dollars per year, all told, for scientists to read the final product.'
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More recently, changes in academia, including increasing requirements for accreditation, have upped the ante on expectations for scholarly contributions from faculty, thus expanding the supply of scholarly articles. For example, the Higher Learning Commission, a regional accreditor of US academic institutions, has stated that faculty must 'contribute to scholarship, creative work, and the discovery of knowledge to the extent appropriate to their programs and the institution's mission. ' 13 Disciplinespecific accreditors also place increased demands on faculty production of scholarly output. For example, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), the top accreditor of business schools, requires that 'the school has produced intellectual contributions that have had an impact on the theory, practice, and/or teaching of business and management consistent with the mission, expected outcomes, and strategies of the school. ' 14 Continued accreditation depends on successfully meeting a minimum of scholarly output. Given temporal constraints and stagnant wages, the demands on an average faculty member have increased considerably. Faculty members looking for lower-cost ways to disseminate their research to a broader audience may look to nontraditional vehicles of publication without complete information regarding their legitimacy.
The second important role of academic and research institutions is to act as buyers in the market by purchasing journal subscriptions to give researchers, students, and the public access to research results. Since the institutions are funded, at least in part, by the public, this structure means that the public is paying for journal subscriptions to access the results of research that it paid researchers to conduct. And researchers without institutional access to particular publications must purchase journal subscriptions to participate in the knowledge of their field.
The traditional market for scholarly publishing in each academic discipline is dominated by relatively few top journals. These are often managed by organizations of scholars in a given field or by university presses. Sub-disciplines have one or more top journals specializing in a specific area of research. And sometimes related disciplines have wellrespected interdisciplinary journals. For example, the American Economic Review and the Journal of Economic Literature, published by the American Economic Association, are top journals in the discipline of economics.
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The Journal of Economic History 16 is a top journal in the sub-area of economic history. And interdisciplinary journals, for example, Social Science Quarterly, publish economic research more generally related to the social sciences.
The traditional market for scholarly publishing can be analysed using the monopoly model of imperfect competition. For simplicity's sake, assume that an area of study has only one academic journal in which to publish research results. While the assumption of a monopoly is extreme, 17 it helps to identify the general results expected from the traditional model, and it is possible to think of an area in which there is one easily identified dominant scholarly journal.
A monopoly market is characterized by a single producer selling a product with no close substitutes. In this case, consider a single publisher producing the only journal in an academic discipline. There are barriers to entry into the market so that other producers are not able to start a competing journal. Barriers to entry into scholarly publishing include the high costs of administering, editing, and producing journals and the name-brand value of the academic association or university press. The single publisher determines the quantity it will sell and the price it will charge based on its business model, production costs, and the market demand for the journal. A for-profit publisher will set the quantity and price that maximize its profit. A non-profit publisher will set the quantity and price that meet its objective (e.g., maintaining research quality and/or promoting advances of knowledge in the field) while covering production costs.
In either case, for-profit or non-profit, relatively high production costs in the traditional publishing market limit the quantity produced. Without electronic dissemination, both the number of journals and the number of copies of those journals will be much lower. In addition, the speed at which research results are disseminated is much slower. Higher production costs also mean that journal subscription prices must be set to recover those costs. And demand conditions will result in higher subscription prices for journals with low demand (e.g., when the research area is very specialized) or when there is a profit motive. Cross-subsidization in the traditional market means higher prices, either to facilitate the goal of supporting research in a specialized field or to increase profits. For example, if a publisher has a journal with a low demand in a small field and a journal with a high demand in a popular field, it might bundle the two journals for a single subscription price so that the highdemand journal subsidizes production of the low-demand one. Without such cross-subsidization, the specialized journal might not exist.
The standard monopoly model (summarized in Table 1 ) predicts that relatively high production costs and lack of competition in the traditional scholarly publishing market will result in a lower quantity and higher price. Barriers to entry mean there is little incentive to reduce costs, lower subscription prices, or improve the publication process. However, because there are few well-known journals that operate as established brands, the monopoly market reduces information costs by establishing a system for ensuring and identifying quality. open access market for scholarly journal publishing Technological change and the ubiquity of the Internet led to the development of open access publishing as an alternative method of disseminating research results. Increasing subscription prices and decreasing funding for libraries added to the interest in an alternative to the traditional model of scholarly publishing. To remain competitive, colleges and universities must have access to current research, but access can be costly. For example, the annual cost for one small college alone was over $131,000 for e-resources (ejournals and eBooks, and starting this year, a small number of streaming video titles). This is in addition to over $17,000 paid directly to vendors and other cooperative purchasing agreements designed to lower costs. 18 Open access publishing can significantly decrease an institution's library costs.
The expanding market for open access scholarly publishing can be analysed using the competitive market structure model. In the perfectly competitive model, the benefits to producers in the traditional market are transferred to buyers in the form of a higher quantity and a lower price. The perfectly competitive market has many consumers and many producers selling a standardized product, and there are no significant barriers to prevent new producers from entering it. Decreased production costs associated with disseminating research via the Internet allow for the easy entry of new publishers while at the same time allowing anyone with access to the Internet to be a consumer. These attributes give the open access market the essential characteristics of perfect competition. With open access publishing, research articles have free availability on the Internet; therefore the purchase price is zero. The producers in a perfectly competitive market will produce more only as long as the revenue from selling more (i.e., the price) exceeds the cost of production. The price of zero means that producers will not produce without an alternative source of revenue to cover their production costs. In open access publishing, the pay-to-publish option emerged as the alternative revenue source.
In open access markets there is an incentive to increase quantity (i.e., create as much content as possible) in order to increase revenue to cover production costs and, in the case of for-profit publishers, to maximize profits. In reality, though, the product (i.e., scholarly journals) is not a standardized product. The high quantity demanded at a price of zero creates an incentive to increase production without regard to quality and introduces the potential for fraudulent publications. Profits and low barriers to entry into the open access market entice more publishers to enter it. Technology can be used to solicit submissions, review content, and disseminate journals efficiently, so the costs of open access publishing can be very low. The pay-to-publish fees and low costs that are possible with the model make it profitable to start a new journal. However, entry and competition eventually lead to exit and decreased profits in the long run.
As of 2016 there were nearly 10,000 open access journals. Table 2 ) results in a zero price and a higher quantity than the traditional market for scholarly publishing. However, the model creates issues related to revenue sources, quality, and information costs. comparison of existing markets for scholarly journal publishing The scholarly publishing market currently supports both the traditional and open access models. The two models coexist, sometimes within the same publisher. Table 3 compares the characteristics of the traditional and open access markets for scholarly publishing according to basic market structure models in economics. An imperfectly competitive traditional market for scholarly publishing is characterized by fewer publishers and journals than the competitive open access model. An important result from open access publishing is an increase in the quantity of published research. The publishers and journals in the traditional publishing market are stable while the open access publishing market has a larger number of publishers and journals and a high rate of both entry and exit. And, consistent with the basic market structure model, entry and exit lead to a lower price in the market. Price is clearly lower (zero) with the competitive open access model than with the traditional model.
Despite the fact that technological change has reduced production costs for traditional journal publication, without competition there is less incentive to improve the process or lower prices. There may be long delays between article submission and publication (or rejection). And high rejection rates for submitted manuscripts mean that top journals act as 'gatekeepers' with control over the research agendas published. The publication process in the traditional market can mean that the publication of important research results is slowed or prevented. The open 
One Market Failure of the Open Access Model: Imperfect Information
The competitive model assumes perfect information in the market. That is, it assumes all buyers and sellers have the information required to make decisions in the market, for example, information about price and quality. A farmers' market for vegetables is an example of a simple competitive market with perfect information. The price, quantity, and quality of each seller's products are readily available to consumers. But as markets get more complex, information is less available and harder to interpret. In the open access market, a significant information problem has developed. Unlike with vegetables, it is not always easy to determine the quality of a journal. It is difficult for authors submitting their research to have good information about the plethora of journals entering and exiting the open access market, and it is difficult for naïve readers to discern the quality of the articles published in these journals.
The publication process in the imperfectly competitive traditional market assures quality through the established reputation and branding provided by the publisher. The publication process in the traditional model includes an intensive review process by experts in the field, which provides information regarding quality for both authors and readers. The intensive review process provides confidence in the quality of a journal's content. Over time, journals in the traditional market establish a reputation for publishing quality research, although data suggest some variation in the rejection rates for top journals. For example, 2013 data from the American Psychological Association found rejection rates for top journals between 39 per cent and 98 per cent.
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Another Market Failure of the Open Access Model: External Costs Open access publishing creates external costs in the market as the zero price greatly expands the quantity of research published by large numbers of entering and exiting firms. External costs are costs that a producer imposes on others. For example, when production by a manufacturing firm results in air pollution, the cost of that pollution is imposed on society. When open access journals publish research without providing a rigorous review process, the cost of establishing the quality of the research falls on others; therefore, the journal has imposed an external cost. Open access publishing creates inefficiency by passing on to readers the cost of sorting through the large quantity of published research to determine its quality. And low-quality or even fabricated research puts an external cost on society when the research is mistakenly considered reliable. Researchers rely on and cite materials from earlier research to generate new knowledge. Practitioners follow policies based on the outcome of earlier research. Publication of low-quality research can undermine the quality of future research and policy making.
A Third Market Failure of the Open Access Model: Pay-to-Publish In the traditional market, authors submit their articles for peer review and publication. They bear no or minimal mandatory cost for a submission. In contrast, the dissemination of research through open access publishing is often funded through fees paid by authors, the 'pay-topublish' environment. 23 The fees are often clearly stated on submission pages and explained as necessary to cover publication expenses including providing peer review, hosting the journal online, and archiving. So, while open access increases the number of potential outlets for authors' research and decreases the time cost in the publication process, it places the cost of production on authors. This approach incentivizes open access journals to accept articles because publishing additional articles increases their revenue relative to their costs. It also makes an author's ability to pay a determinant of what research is published in addition to (or rather than) research quality.
In competitive markets, the potential for profits provides an incentive for firms to enter. The low cost of entering the open access publishing market means that an entrepreneur can start an open access journal by merely accepting payment for putting the research on a webpage. When authors pay for publishing and an open access journal's revenue stream depends entirely on the number of articles accepted and published, there is no incentive to limit the number of articles published or to provide extensive peer review or editorial services. Pay-to-publish creates an incentive for overproduction as well as quality concerns and fraud.
addressing the market failures of the open access model
The traditional and open access publishing markets for scholarly journal publishing generate different benefits and costs. The traditional publishing model helps to assure quality but restricts output and raises the price. The open access publishing model leads to higher quantity and a zero price for buyers, but the pay-to-publish approach results in information costs and external costs due to the high number of journals with varying levels of quality. The goal for scholarly publishing should be to maximize the net benefit of technological change in the industry by taking advantage of the efficiency offered by open access publishing while preventing the market failures that result when moving away from the traditional publishing model. Achieving this goal requires that scholarly journals minimize costs, provide optimal quantity (i.e., increase output and access to that output), and lower the price, while maintaining quality. Ultimately, efforts by all parties involved in scholarly publishing (e.g., scholarly associations, academia, publishers, accrediting bodies, libraries, authors) will be needed to transform the scholarly publishing market.
Addressing Imperfect Information
Addressing imperfect information in the market for scholarly publishing requires a process for evaluating the quality of a publication and providing that information to consumers. Much as product labelling helps consumers determine the nutritional value of the food they consider purchasing, publicly available information about the quality of a scholarly journal will help both authors and readers choose among the many open access journals. An alternative to the approach used in the traditional model is needed for the efficiency benefits of open access publishing to obtain by providing information about research quality.
The technology that led to open access publishing also has the potential to facilitate the provision of information about individual research articles and open access journals. If open access journals were to provide an online forum for comments on their articles, then readers could provide feedback on their quality. To the extent that a reader is qualified to evaluate the research, the feedback will provide information to other potential readers about the quality of individual articles and, based on many comments over time, of the journal itself -much like the quality ratings for other online sellers. Yet the frequent entry and exit of open access journals means that a more systematic and long-term approach to evaluating quality will also be required.
Until he recently shut down his blog, university librarian Jeffrey Beall maintained a list of publishers with questionable open access publishing practices to guide those seeking to determine the legitimacy of publishers.
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In addition, organizations such as the DOAJ have worked to evaluate open access publications. The DOAJ calls itself 'a community-curated online directory that indexes and provides access to high quality, open access, peer-reviewed journals. ' 25 But while Beall and others have done a great service by providing awareness about fraudulent publishing, the long-term solution requires a concerted, comprehensive effort. Learned societies, scholarly publishers, research institutions, accrediting bodies (e.g., AACSB), authors, and readers must all play a role in establishing standards for research and creating a system for providing information about the legitimacy and quality of scholarly journals. Experts in each discipline should consider the early attempts to evaluate journals and use them to develop a journal classification system appropriate to their area of study.
Addressing External Costs
When any scholarly journal publishes unreliable or fraudulent research, it creates an external cost. For example, unreliable research on the side effects of a vaccination can affect decisions regarding its use and lead to large costs to society from ill-informed health policy and consumer decisions based on that research. The open access publishing market decreases the incentive for rigorous peer review and increases the incentive to enlarge the quantity of research published. These incentives create the potential for external costs in the scholarly publishing market. Addressing external costs requires a system for preventing fraudulent and unreliable research, including altering incentives that motivate fraud and monitoring journals' peer-review process.
The present academic reward system helps to feed the market for publication by providing an incentive for academics to publish. Academics have reason to strive for quantity over quality when publishing in a system that rewards the number of article citations without adequate regard for the quality of the research. This incentive, combined with a for-profit open access publishing market, creates high external costs. Academic institutions and accrediting bodies can make changes to their evaluation systems to increase the incentive for quality over quantity and punish publishing that is found to be fraudulent. One way for institutions to evaluate the quality of research in the context of job performance review was discussed in a 2016 article by Ray.
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In addition, scholarly associations and research institutions can help to assure quality by establishing minimum standards for peer review and by participating in and evaluating journals' peer-review processes based on the accepted standards. It is evident that attempts at self-regulation for open access publishers have failed and will continue to fail. Bogus 'impact factors' are disinformation. A certification system that exemplifies the expectation of rigorous review from unbiased experts, like that associated with traditional scholarly publishing, but that does not perpetuate the gatekeeping and monopolizing of traditional publishing is needed for an efficient scholarly publishing market. As an example, some organizations have already developed standards for information quality such as the Institute of Museum and Library Services' Guidelines for Information Dissemination, which include quality, utility, objectivity, and integrity of information.
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Addressing Pay-to-Publish The pay-to-publish model associated with open access publishing was created to cover the costs of publishing with open access (i.e., a zero subscription price). One argument against the traditional publishing model is that institutions must pay high subscription fees to access research they paid their faculty to conduct and evaluate. That is, traditional journals receive their input (research articles and peer reviews) from research institutions at very low (or zero) cost and then sell access to the resulting research articles through high subscription rates. However, with the open access model, the cost of production does not disappear. There is still a cost to administer, review, edit, and produce open access journals. However, with open access publishing, the cost is shifted to authors (or the grants/institutions that fund them) through submission and publication fees. It is ironic that an author must pay a large submission and/or publication fee to publish her own work in hopes of a pay raise. In addition, these fees create an equity issue because faculty with higher salaries are better able to pay submission and publication fees.
In the pay-to-publish model, the benefit that consumers receive from open access publishing comes at the expense of authors, not at the expense of publishers. Rather than paying for publishing through journal subscription fees, research institutions shift the cost of publishing to their faculty members and research budgets. Non-research institutions benefit from access to research at no cost but do not pay for it. The pay-to-publish model of open access publishing does not address the inequity of those who pay for research having to pay again to access research results. Rather, it increases the inequity by concentrating the cost of publishing on authors and research budgets rather than spreading it across all consumers through subscription fees.
In response to the expansion of pay-to-publish, there is a movement for universities to provide funding for open access publishing submissions. Over fifty colleges and universities have signed the Compact for Open-Access Publishing Equity. The compact asks institutions to establish funds for faculty to assist with the charges of open access publishing. These monies underwrite 'reasonable publication charges for articles written by [the institution's own] faculty and published in fee-based open-access journals and for which other institutions would not be expected to provide funds.'
28 Signatories include Harvard, MIT, Cornell, and Texas A&M University. This source of funding suggests that one alliance of academic institutions finds value in open access publishing and seeks to encourage the model.
A cooperative approach to funding open access publishing could help to address the pay-to-publish inefficiency in the market for scholarly publishing, but only if information and external cost issues are also addressed so that increased funding does not only increase the profits of open access journals and therefore boost the incentive for low quality and fraud. However, if producing a journal has costs and consuming scholarly research has value, the efficient price is above zero. When a good has a zero price, there is an incentive for overconsumption. Spreading the cost of scholarly publishing across all consumers through subscription fees prevents the overproduction and overconsumption that result from a zero price. The traditional subscription approach combined with increased competition would allocate the efficient number of resources to scholarly publishing while lowering subscription prices.
It is important, however, for those underwriting publication charges to note that submission fees and publication fees create very different incentives, and any system for subsidizing open access publishing must consider the appropriate incentives to minimize low-quality and fraudulent publication. Submission fees subsidize the publication of higherquality research (accepted articles) with the fees charged to rejected articles. Unlike submission fees, publication fees create an incentive for the journal to publish as many articles as possible, regardless of quality, to increase its revenue stream. A legitimate journal incurs a cost when research is submitted for editorial review and then perhaps peer review. Since such cost is associated with all submissions, there should be a charge for all submissions, whether a paper ends up being accepted or rejected. A submission fee creates a disincentive for authors to submit low-quality research that has a significant probability of being rejected prior to or subsequent to peer review.
A shift to submission fees would require that journals provide review and editing services valuable enough to justify up-front fees. Developing and maintaining a reputation for quality would become essential for an open access journal to succeed financially. Predatory for-profit open access journals would obviously not want to change their policy of charging publication fees; therefore publication fees would become an indicator of poor quality.
conclusion Advances in technology have lowered costs and expanded access to information on the Internet. This expanded access to information has resulted in great benefits. But the advances have also created costs in the form of fake news and fraudulent publications. To maximize the net benefit of technological change in the scholarly publishing market will require a balance of price with cost, quantity with quality, and verifiability with openness. Those promoting the open access publishing model will need to develop processes to correct for market failures while traditional publishers will need to incorporate changes that increase efficiency and reduce price. Just as intervention by Google and Facebook were necessary in response to fake news, intervention in the scholarly publishing market will be necessary to assure ongoing access to reliable, high-quality research.
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